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DROIT DU TRAVAIL 
MUST AN INDIVIDUAL UNION MEMBER'S RIGHTS BE 
SACRIFICED TO PROTECT THE GROUP INTEREST ? 
Reuben M. Bromstein 
Assuming that an individual employée can neither sue 
directly on the collective agreement nor force the union to 
take his case through to arbitration, can he proceed against 
the union for its failure to discharge its duty to represent 
his interests? 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article J is to review, in a gênerai way, some of 
the more widely proposed solutions to this question with spécial emphasis 
on the « duty of f air représentation » concept, as developed in the United 
States, and to highlight some of the limitations, as well as the commend-
able features, of the various avenues of attack. 
The emphasis of this work is on the situation in Ontario so that both 
the applicable Fédéral and Ontario législation were deemed most relevant 
Reuben M. Bromstein, L.L.D., Thompson, Rogers, Barristers and Sollicitors, 
Toronto. 
1
 This paper was prepared for Associate Dean H. W. Arthur's Spring 1969 
Labour Problems Seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. 
The topic, Responsible Décision making in Démocratie Trade Unions, is 
fruitfully discussed by E. E. Palmer for the Task Force on Labour Relations in 
a separate work to be published by the Queen's Printer sometime in early 1970. 
Palmer surveys the problems involved in attempting to reconcile démocratie and 
responsible décision making in trade unions, including in particular an assessment 
of individual rights within organizations which must act as cohesive groups if 
they are to function effectively as collective bargaining agents. A seemingly ex-
haustive list of the relevant articles, texts, and cases are included in the biblio-
graphy, footnotes and appendices and it is to be hoped that its publication will 
not be delayed. 
The Background Notes prepared for the Canadian Bar Association, Industrial 
Relations Section, Panel Discussion of September 2nd, 1965 contains a list of 
pertinent cases, quotations and comment. 
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to the problem. The American expérience, particularly in relation to the 
judicially developed duty of fair représentation, has been well mooted 
in the available literature, and seemed to provide a useful comparison to 
the Ontario situation. 
It would seem that in certain limited instances an employée is pro-
tected from rank discrimination by his union. For example : 
« . . . Boards, using their discrétion as to what constitutes a « qualified > 
union, might be willing to decertify any union which engages in such 
discriminatory activities. . . . to the extent that union activity affecting 
a member finds no support in the union constitution it may be declared 
ultra vires. Upon proper évidence the common law action for con-
spiracy may also provide protection for the individual worker, as it 
did in Boit v. S.LU.2 where the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
found that the plaintiff had been excluded from the union hiring hall 
as a resuit of a conspiracy on the party of the union executive. Again, 
statements such as that by Sidney Smith, J.A. 3 that : « One might . . . 
speculate whether the statutory privilège of a Union to contract with 
employers on behalf of its members had not added a fiduciary aspect 
to their relationship. » indicates that the courts are willing to entertain 
ideas similar to those in this field in the United States. » 4 
In addition, the décision of the Suprême Court of Canada in Re 
Hoogendoorn 5 may be an indication that the courts would consider the 
deprivation of an individual's rights under a grievance to be a déniai of 
natural justice 6. 
Unfortunately, unless an employée is able to dérive a right of action 
under the above-mentioned possibilities, (and it must be emphasized that 
they are no more than possibilities), he is at the mercy of the Union, and 
may be unable to find any satisfaction whatosoever should the union fail 
to protect his interests. 
A union may compromise the position of an individual employée 
during the negotiation as well as the administration of the collective agree-
ment. Although an employée may hâve some vested rights which will be 
protected in a court,7 essentially he dérives his rights from the collective 
agreement and the bargaining power of the union. 
2 26 D.L.R. (2d) 441 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961). 
3 White v. Kuzych [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187, 201 (B.C.C.A.). 
4
 Palmer, The Impact of Union Security in Canada, Buffalo L.R. 13:515, at 
p. 533. 
5 Re Hoogendoorn & Greening Métal Products, [1968] S.C.R. 30:65 D.L.R. 
(2d) 641, rev'g. [1967] 1 O.R. 713. 
6 See Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship, 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 786 at 
p. 804, and case comment by Ferguson, O.H.L.J. Volume 6, No. 1, 113. 
7 For example see Regina v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co., (1962), 31 
D.L.R. 209, 
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 327 
The interests of the employée and the union, usually considered to be 
identical, are sometimes conflicting. During the negotiation of the agree-
ment the union may bargain away a job category, a wage increase or other 
interest of an individual employée, in order to conclude an agreement 
which is bénéficiai to the union as a whole or to a majority in the union. 
While the union's freedom of action must be protected, at the same 
time the union cannot be allowed to bargain away with complète equanimity 
an individual's rights so as to benefit other members of the union. In addi-
tion, it cannot be allowed to compromise an individual's rights under the 
collective agreement by refusing to process legitimate grievances. The 
union has life and meaning only so long as it works for the interests of the 
individuals that it represents. As the union dérives its exclusive bargaining 
authority from the Labour Relations Act8, it has the duty to work for 
members and non-members without discrimination. 
It is generally agreed that a collective agreement establishes a frame-
work for the terms and conditions of employment, reduces conflict and 
brings stability to the union-employer relationship. Agreements are often 
deliberately ambiguous, and there are many accidentai omissions and un-
foreseen problems. Any disputes that arise of necessity within the jurisdic-
tion of the union's authority. If the union does not fight for the individual, 
he may be without remedy. 
8
 Labour Relations législation now in force are : 
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 152, 
amended 1966-67, c. 62. 
The Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 167, amended 1957, c. 38 ; 1958, 
c. 82 ; 1959, c. 35 ; 1960, c. 54 and c. 80 ; 1964, c. 41 ; 1966, c. 13, s. 94 ; 
1968, c. 51. 
Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, amended 1961, c. 31 ; 1963, 
c. 20 ; 1968, c. 26. 
The Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 132, amended 1956, c. 38 ; 1967, 
c. 36 ; 1958, c. 29 and c. 67 ; 1959, c. 32 ; 1960, c. 78 ; 1962, c. 35 ; 1963, c. 41 ; 
1966, c. 33. 
Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 124, as amended 1953, c. 21 ; 1955, 
c. 57 ; 1956, c. 43 ; 1959, c. 56 ; 1960, c. 45 ; 1960-61, c. 52 ; 1966, c. 73. 
The Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1952, c. 258, amended 1959, c. 1 ; 1960, 
c. 58 ; 1963, c. 82 ; 1966, c. 39 ; 1967, c. 12 ; 1968, c. 71. 
Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 311, amended 1968, c. 59. 
The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, amended 1961-62, c. 68 ; 1963, 
c. 70 ; 1964, c. 53 ; 1966, c. 76. 
The Industrial Relations Act, S.P.E.I. 1962, c. 18, as amended 1963, c. 20 ; 
1966, c. 19 ; 1966 (2nd session), c. 3. 
The Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141 ; amended 1965, c. 50, c. 14 ; 1968, c. 19, 
c. 45 ; 1969, Bill 50, proclaimed in force in August and September, 1969. 
The Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 287, as amended 1966, c. 83 ; 1968, c. 79 ; 
1969, c. 66. 
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Within the plant there are often diverse groups whose interests will 
conflict with the claims of individuals in any given instance. There are 
often several classes of individuals that hâve varying and opposing interests. 
A claim by one employée will often affect workers in similar jobs and the 
adjustment of an individual grievance may in turn cause gains or losses 
for other workers. This means that there will often be conflicting pressures 
on the union from divergent groups within the union itself. The union owes 
a duty to ail employées in the plant. In attempting to résolve thèse conflicts 
it may well choose to placate a larger group of workers and the indivi-
dual's claim may be sacrificed to the « greater good ». 
A plant must function efficiently and productively. Government po-
licy is to promote industrial peace 9. Joint union and management control 
of the labour relations process helps achieve the objectives of industrial 
harmony and productivity. Thèse goals will also be furthered if the indi-
vidual is not deprived of his rights, nor alienated from the existing system. 
A way must be found to create meaningful individual rights, récognition of 
which is the price which union and employer must pay for the privilège 
of otherwise unfettered freedom of opération of the productive system.10 
UNFAIR VERSUS FAIR UNION BEHAVIOUR 
In analyzing possible remédies that an individual employée may hâve 
against the union that represents his interests, it will be helpful to separate 
those areas in which the union acts unfairly towards an individual, and 
those in which by an objective définition the union may well acted fairly 
towards the employée but has in effect deprived him of effective redress 
for a legitimate grievance. Under the category of unfair behaviour are 
included actions in which the union displays arbitrary, discriminatory, and 
hostile attitudes. In thèse instances, the union, or its leadership, u displays 
an intention to deliberately override the individual's interests. Alternatively, 
the union could by gross négligence 12 achieve the same resuit. There are, 
however, many situations in which the union may act fairly and merito-
riously from the union's, and even from an objective, point of view, but 
not necessarily from the individual's standpoint. If the merits of the claim 
alone are considered, we might arrive at an entirely différent conclusion. 
As will be seen, the courts in the United States recognize that an individual 
will hâve a claim under the duty of fair représentation when a union acts 
unfairly, but not otherwise. 
9 See Arthurs, supra, footnote 6 at p. 702. 
!0 Blumrosen, Légal Protection for Critical Job Interests, (1959) 13 Rutgers 
L.J. 631 at p. 650. 
11
 In some cases the union leaders may individually, and for personal reasons, 
abuse their positions. In other cases the union leadership may act to protect its 
interests as a group, and in some instances they may do things believing they are 
acting in the best interests of the union as a whole. 
12
 See footnote 61, infra. 
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POSSIBLE REMÉDIES 
The remédies that may be available to the individual fall into three 
recognized catégories 13 namely, judicially created rights, législative rights 
(which include those arising under administrative bodies), and rights pro-
vided by unions themselves. 
JUDICIALLY CREATED REMÉDIES 
The courts consider themselves the guardians of the public interest 
and hâve not hesitated to castigate unions when they behave in a manner 
considered detrimental by the courts to the gênerai welfare of the com-
munity. They may well décide that union excesses and abuses against 
individual employées should be proscribed by the judiciary : 14 
« Both labour boards and courts hâve begun to grope towards a solution 
by giving the employée a remedy against the union based upon a 
breach of a fiduciary duty 15 violation of the union's constitution 16 or 
perhaps illegality under the labour relations législation ». 17 
The Woods Report18 has pointed out that: 
«A member or prospective member of a union may appeal to the 
courts if he feels his légal rights hâve been abridged. But thèse rights 
are not always clear ; they can be minimal, légal costs can be great, 
and a décision can be long in coming. Thus, resort to the courts scarcely 
provides a complète answer, although it has had salutary effect in 
several cases ». 19 
In Re Hoogendoorn20 and in Bradley21 the courts seem to hâve 
adopted the view that the employée wàll be permitted to « intervene in 
13 See Arthurs, op. cit., supra, footnote 6, at p. 801. 
14 For a list of cases and relevant quotations on the basis of judicial inter-
vention see Backround Notes prepared for the Canadian Bar Association, supra, 
footnote 1. 
15 See e.g. Homak v. Patterson, (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 175 (B.C.C.A.) cf. 
Murphy v. Robertson, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 30 (Man. C.A.). 
16 See e.g. S.I.U. v. Stem, [1961] S.C.R. 682 ; Orchard v. Tunney [1957] S.C.R. 
436. 
17 See Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd., (1965), 66 C.L.L.C. p. 16, 071 
(O.L.R.B.) ; Plumbers Union, Local 67, [1968] Oct. Mthly. Rep. 513 (O.L.R.B.) ; 
Vera Elkington and the Wallace Barnes Co. Ltd., 61 C.L.L.C. 928 ; Arthurs, 
op. cit., supra, footnote 6 at p. 804. 
18 Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour 
Relations (the Wood's Report) Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969. 
19
 Ibid., at p. 102. 
20
 Supra, footnote 5. 
21 R. v. Ottawa Firefighters, ex p. Bradley, [1967] 2 O.R. 311 (C.A.), 63 
D.L.R. (2d) 376. 
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arbitration proceedings in which the union is seeking a resuit which speci-
fically, directly and adversely affects his interests ». 22 This judicially cre-
ated right, which is a direct assault on the union's exclusive power to 
administer the collective agreement, may well be a harbinger of things 
to corne. 23 
In one Suprême Court of Canada case, Martland J. pointed out that: 
« A union has, as a resuit of certification, ceased to be a purely 
voluntary association of individuals. It has become a légal entity, 
with the status of bargaining agent for a group of employées, ail of 
whom are thereby brought into association with it, whether as members, 
or as persons whom it can bind by a collective agreement, even though 
not members. It must, as their agent, deal with the members of the 
group which it represents equitably.^ (emphasis added).24 
Whether the court would resort to the familiar légal pigeon holes of 
contract, usage, agency, trust or tort25 in devising a remedy is, of course, 
a matter of conjecture. The duty of fair représentation, to be discussed 
infra, would seem to roll ail of thèse concepts into one nominate remedy. 
Although this road is not necessarily exclusive to the judiciary, it has been 
the avenue used by the courts in the United States. As has been mentioned 
it would seem to be under considération by Canadian judges. 26 
There are many possible unfortunate side-effects to judicially created 
remédies in the area of industrial relations. Courts tend to be insufficiently 
aware of the underlying structure and problems and bring to bear légal 
considérations that many often exacerbate problems unnecessarily. Al-
though thèse are not inévitable side-effects, the generally unfavourable 
reaction of unions to the courts indicates that it might be more conducive 
to industrial harmony if remédies for individuals were developed else-
where. 27 
22
 Arthurs, op. cit., supra, footnote 6 at p. 804. 
23
 Supra, footnote 6. 
24
 OU Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-601, v. 
The Impérial OU Co. Ltd., 1963 S.C.R. 584 at p. 593 ; 41 D.L.R. (2d) 1. 
25 For example, see Cox, Rights Under a Labour Agreement, (1956) 69 Harv. 
L. R. 601 at p. 619. Many of the articles in footnote 45, infra, contain arguments 
in favour of one or more of thèse légal concepts. Also see Background Notes, 
C.B.A., supra, footnote 1. 
26 Supra, footnote 24. 
2? The above discussion assumes that the courts can intervene. The Rights of 
Labour Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 354 s. 3, would indicate otherwise, although the section 
seems to be disregarded in practice. 
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LÉGISLATIVE REMÉDIES 
There are no fédéral or provincial statutes which specifically place 
a duty of fair représentation on unions. 28 There are, however, various 
provisions, in the acts which may assist an individual to achieve redress 
against the union if discriminated against because of race, national origin, 
colour, religion, sex or âge. 
Fair Employment practices législation is enacted at the fédéral level 
and in eight provinces. 29 British Columbia and Ontario hâve enacted 
spécifie législation to prevent âge discrimination.30 At the fédéral level we 
hâve the Female Employées Equal Pay Act and eight provinces hâve légis-
lation designed to achieve similar ends.31 
A remedy created by législation, or by the administrative bodies cre-
ated by the Labour Relations Act, would hâve merit in that it would most 
probably be based on the expectations of the parties and an understanding 
of the industrial relations System. 
Législation could be passed allowing an individual to sue the union 
in a court for damages. Some authorities 32 hâve suggested that the remedy 
28
 In Québec Article 88 of the Labour Code provides that "Every grievance 
shall be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided in the collective agreement 
if it so provides and the parties abide by it ; otherwise it shall be referred to an ar-
bitration officer chosen by the parties or, failing agreement, appointed by the 
Minister." Presumably, under this article, an employée may carry an unanswered 
complaint to arbitration. It does not seem to prevent a union from carrying a 
grievance to arbitration and adversely affecting and individual's rights so as to benefit 
the group. 
29 Canada Fair Employment Practices Act, S.C. 1952-53, c. 19 ; 1966-67, c. 62. 
Human Rights Act, S.A. 1966, c. 39 ; 1969, c. 52. 
Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 137, amended 1964, c. 19. 
The Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 81, as amended 1956, c. 20. 
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 13. 
Human Rights Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 130. 
The Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O. 1961-62, c. 93 ; as amended 1965, c. 85 ; 
1967, c. 6 6 ; 1968, c. 85. 
Employment Discrimination Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 142. 
The Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293. 
30 Age Discrimination Act, R.S.O. 1966, c. 3 ; 1968, c.2. 
Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 137 amended 1964, c. 19 ; s.4. 
31 Female Employées Equal Pay Act, S.C. 1956, c. 38 ; 1966-67, c. 62. 
The Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 167 amended 1957, c. 38 ; 1958, c. 82 ; 
1959, c. 35 ; 1960, c. 54 and c. 80 ; 1964, c. 41 ; 1966, c. 13, s. 94. 
Equal Pay Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 131. 
The Equal Pay Act, S.M. 1956, c. 18 amended 1962, c. 66. 
Female Employées Fair Rémunération Act, S.N.B. 1960-61, c. 7. 
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 130, s. 6 (1). 
The Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O. 1961-62, c. 93 as amended 1965, c. 85, 
s. 5 (1 ) . 
The Equal Pay Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 294. 
32 See Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10, at p. 658. 
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be limited to an order requiring the union to carry the issue through to 
final arbitration, thereby avoiding many of the problems that arise when 
a court becomes involved in a labour dispute. 
As an alternative to the courts, it may be argued that a Labour Rela-
tions Board 33 or a Labour Court34 could provide a proper forum for ad-
judication of individual disputes. Labour Relations Boards hâve attempted 
to provide solutions to the problem.35 Under the gênerai powers of inquiry 
by Labour Relations Boards, and it should be noted that some boards 
seem to hâve wider powers than others, a board may be able to consider 
the union's behaviour to be an unfair labour practice proscribed by the 
governing act. In Ontario, for example, section 65 4 (a) may provide the 
basis for such action. Presumably the argument is that a Board could 
fashion a remedy, including, for example, one based on the duty of fair 
représentation, which would do justice to the individual's clairn against 
the union. In extrême cases it would now seem to hâve the power to de-
certify unions and award damages.36 Given a precipitous instance, the 
board might décide that the appropriate remedy is to force the union to 
exhaust arbitration procédures on behalf of the individual, or alternatively, 
pay compensation for any losses incurred. 
Most individuals are unable to afford experienced counsel. If the 
L.R.B. was able to bring administrative machinery to bear on behalf of the 
individual, it might save him considérable time and money.37 
There are obvious merits to a remedy fashioned within the framework 
of the labour relations system. Presumably issues would be considered by 
impartial observers who are steeped in the needs and problems of the 
system, but who would also bring to bear concepts of justice and equity 
that will help préserve the integrity of the individual. If a Labour Court 
is created, or if the L.R.B. were to act as a court when it considers thèse 
matters, a jurisprudence of labour relations may develop in this area. 
The L.R.B. is the body charged with the obligation of ensuring in-
dustrial peace and implementing the act. It seems logical to look to it for 
solutions. A review of the work of the Ontario Board would probably show 
that, although it has ingeniously developed its mandate in the face of 
great obstacles, it must tread gingerly when it extends the functions nor-
mally considered to be within its jurisdiction under the act. This would 
indicate that, in the absence of unique circumstances, such as a sprctacular 
case which captures the public interest, whereby a board's actions might be 
widely acclaimed, a législative direction will probably be needed before 
the Board can make much headway in this area. 
33
 Op. cit., supra, footnote 18 at p. 152. 
34 Some European countries use Labour Courts. 
35 See page one. 
36 See page one and Laskin, Collective Bargaining and Individual Rights, 
(1963) 6 C.B.J. 278. 
37 Lewis, Fair Représentation in Grievance Administration, [1967] U. Chi-
Sup. Ct. Review 81 at p. 97. 
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UNION CREATED REMÉDIES 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, 
« third, and most dramatic, union created tribunals, such as the UAW 
Public Review Board, 38 represent a more promising forum for genuine 
employée protection than administrative tribunals or the regular courts ». 
If the answer to individual problems were to corne from the union itself, 
there is no doubt that this would indicate the increasing maturity of unions. 
An effective internai remedy would be dramatic évidence of union desires 
to be more démocratie and effectively represent individual interests. Un-
fortunately, few unions are this farsighted and the basic union philosophy 
that décries individual needs and emphasizes collective action mitigates 
against this form of internai self-development. 
A number of problems in connection with union created tribunals 
arise. How does one ensure that the union will comply with the décisions 
of an independent board, particularly if the board décides that the union 
acted unfairly even though ail proper procédures were followed? 39 The 
fighting mission of the union which promûtes a party line adhérence, and 
brands those who oppose collective interests as « scabs », indicates that 
the limitation of individual rights seems to be a too often accepted fact of 
union life. 
One review of the work of the UAW Public Review Board 40 pointed 
out that in the first ten years of its work, there were sixty appeals involv-
ing grievance handling and that « In none of thèse cases was the appellant 
able to convince the Board that his grievance was handled for improper 
motivations. » 41 
In establishing the tribunal composed of independent and respected 
people, the U.A.W. had provided, not surprisingly, that « in no event 
shall the Public Review Board hâve the jurisdiction to review in any way 
an officiai collective bargaining policy of the International Union »,4 2 
and that improper handling was defined to mean « fraud, discrimination, 
38 See Arthurs, op. cit., supra, footnote 6 at p. 801. 
39 Krouner, Arbitration on a New Frontier — the Public Review Board of 
the United Automobile Workers, A Quasi-arbitral Body for Dispute Settlements 
in the Internai Affairs of a Labour Union, discusses this point as does the Wood's 
Report. For further discussions on Public Review Boards see Note, Public Review 
Boards : A Check on Union Disciplinary Power (1958), 11 Stan. L. Rev. 497 ; 
Obérer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labour Unions : Some Reflections (1959), 
58 Mich. L. Rev. 55 ; Stieber, Obérer, & Harrington, Democracy and Public Review 
(1960) ; Klein, U.A.W. Public Review Board Report, Rutgers L.R. Vol. 18, 1964, 
p. 308 ; Articles in Fund for the Republic Report, Democracy and Public Review, 
done for the Center for the study of Démocratie Institutions, Santa Barbara, Cali-
fornia ( 1 9 6 0 ) ; Brookes, Impartial Public Review of Internai Union Disputes; 
Experiment in Démocratie Self-Discipline, Ohio State L.R. Vol. 22, (1961) p. 89. 
4 0
 Ibid, Krouner. 
41 Ibid, at pp. 12-14. 
42 Ibid, at p. 14. 
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or collusion with management ». 43 It would appear that thèse require-
ments, while protecting individuals from overt hostile on the paît of the 
union, will not assist in protecting the individual's interests when they 
conflict with majority needs or if he is unable to prove the union acted 
maliciously even if he had a meritorious claim. 
The report concluded that the Public Review Board was useful in 
that it forced the union to stick to its constitutional principles and brought 
the U.A.W. the highest relative standard of union democracy in the 
United States. " 
The principles laid down by the U.A.W. are not unlike the ones 
enforced by the courts in the duty of fair représentation. If nothing else, 
the U.A.W. will be spared the embarrassment of being taken to court 
and having the courts impose the duty on the union. It would appear to 
be asking a great deal of a union to extend the principle any further at this 
time. The union would feel that it was acting against its own best interests 
in so doing. Whether it will do so in the future remains to be seen. It 
would, of course, indicate an extrême degree of maturity, and be a welcome 
development. 
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRÉSENTATION 
The spécifie remedy that has been most exhaustively explored in 
the American literature 45 is known as the duty of fair représentation. 
43 ibid, atp. 17. 
44 ibid, at p. 29. 
45 Aside from other works mentioned in the footnotes to this essay, see : 
Comm. on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Re-
port, in A.B.A. Section of Labour Relations Law, Proceedings 33 (1954), re-
printed, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143 (1955); 
Dunau, Employée Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargain-
ing, 50 Col. L.R. 731 (1950); 
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labour Relations 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 
(1959); 
Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employée as Against the Employer, 
8 Lab. LJ. 316 (1957); 
Lenhoff, The Effect of Labour Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 Arb. 
J. (n.s.) 3 (1954). 
McRee, The Adversely Affected Employée and the Grievance and Arbitration 
Process in Symposium on Labour Relations Law 431 (Slovenko éd. 1961); Note, 
34 Ind. LJ. 462 (1959). 
Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance — Whose Grievance Is It? 11 U. 
Pitt. L.R. 35 (1949). 
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In the United States this légal right of action was developed by the 
judiciary. In the case that established the duty of fair représentation, 
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 46 an employée sued his union and his 
employer to enjoin enforcement of contract provisions that had been 
negotiated by his union représentative and that discriminated against him. 
The court found for the petitioner and pointed out that a congressional 
grant of power under labour relations législation gives power to a union 
to act as exclusive collective bargaining représentative with a correspond-
ing réduction of individual rights of the employées, and this in turn must 
impose on the union a duty 
« to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it on behalf of ail those 
for whom it acts, including non-union or minority union members 
without hostile discrimination against them » 47 
It must act fairly impartially, and in good faith48. Although the case 
arose under the Railway Labor Act and involved racial discrimination, 
the concept has been extended to embrace other labour législation and 
other discriminatory practices. The National Labour Relations Act im-
poses a similar obligation49. In the Miranda Fuel Case, the N.L.R.B. 
found that a union's breach of its duty of fair représentation was an 
unfair labour practice50. 
In one of the more récent décisions of the U.S. Suprême Court, 
the duty was defined as follows : 
« Under this doctrine the exclusive agent's statutory authority to 
represent ail members of a designated unit includes a statutory 
obligation to serve the interests of ail members without hostility or 
discrimination towards any, to exercise its discrétion with complète 
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct».51 
In developing the protection available through enforcement of the 
duty of fair représentation, the courts had no ready-made standards of 
fairness. It was reasonably clear that the duty was violated whenever 
the union's handling of a grievance is influenced by union memberships 
or activities, union politics, the exercise of political rights, or sheer 
favouritisim 53. 
Bad faith or abuse of discrétion is now found in most instances if 
the "unfair" handling of the situation relates to race, membership in a 
46 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
47 ibid, at 203. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Syres v. OU Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892, reversing per curiam 222 F. 2d 
739 (5th Cir. 1955); Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944). 
50 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), 325 F . 2nd 172 (2d Cir. 1963). 
51 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); 87 S. Ct. 903, at p. 910 per White J. 
53 Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreement, 8 Lab. 
L.J. 850, 858-9 (1967). 
336 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 25, NO 2 
rival union, political affiliation and sometimes on the basis of marital 
status and sex54. 
From récent décisions, it would seem that a union will hâve 
discharged its duty even though it may be quite mistaken about the 
merits of an employee's grievance. In Vaca v. Sipes55 the majority of the 
Suprême Court ruled that proof of merit of an individual clairn is not 
enough as the employée must also prove that the union's refusai to 
process his grievance was arbitrary and in bad faith. The importance of 
the asserted right to the employée seems to hâve no significance56. 
Professor Cox, a leading authority in the subject has said that there 
would be a breach of the duty if the union refused to press a justifiable 
grievance either because of laziness, préjudice or unwillingness to expend 
money on behalf of employées who were not members of the union. 
The unions obligation is to act in "good faith" toward the employée. It 
would be a defence to show that the union and employer had made a 
seulement or that the union's décision not to press the clairn was honest 
and reasonable 57. 
Cox admits that 
« In practice the value of the right of fair représentation must be 
heavily discounted because often only small sums are likely to be 
involved, because this branch of labor law is full of uncertainties 
and because individual workers often hâve difficulty in obtaining 
skilled and imaginative légal service ». 58 
It would seem that the union behaves towards the individual in 
good faith if it bases its décisions on the legitimate interests of a group, 
even though the group interests are in opposition to the legitimate 
interests of the individual. This coincides with the American Suprême 
Court's décision that the presumption is in favour of the union having 
acted in good faith unless the individual can prove otherwise. A clairn 
which is meritorious from an individual's point of view, may be non-
meritorious from the perspective of the larger group and the test for 
validity of a clairn has in effect become the group interest59. The resuit 
éliminâtes the original presumption on which the duty of fair repré-
sentation was based. The duty was created because the individual was 
to be protected from the group. If the group interest becomes the test 
of validity of a clairn the right may become meaningless to the individual 
employée. 
54 Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10, at p. 655. 
55 Supra, footnote 51. Also see Humphrey v. Moore, (1964) 375 U.S. 335. 
56 Lewis, op. cit., supra, footnote 37, at p. 108. 
57 Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10 at p. 654. 
58 Cox, op. cit., supra, footnote 25 at p. 634. 
59 Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10, at p. 656. 
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Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Vaca v. Sipes, 60 said that : 
« Thus, Owens, who now has obtained a judicial interprétation that 
he was wrongfully discharged (the jury had awarded punitive damages) 
is left remediless, and Swift, having breached its contract, is allowed 
to hide behind and is shielded by, the union's conduct. I simply fail 
to see how it should make one iota of différence... whether the 
union's conduct is wrongful or rightful. » 
So long as the duty of fair représentation is so narrowly defined, 
the individual remains at the mercy of the union leadership. If it does 
not act in an overt hostile (or grossly négligent61) manner towards an 
individual in a grievance dispute, it may effectively eliminate his just 
claims. Even though it acts fairly towards an employée the employée 
may lose the benefit of a just claim. 
The individual's rights may often be destroyed even though there 
was no deliberate discrimination or vindictiveness. Union officiais are 
burdened with many problems. They may find it in the best interests of 
the majority of the union members to trade off some legitimate grievances 
when a total package is advantageous 62. It may not hâve the time to 
make a complète investigation of the facts, may rely on unexamined 
évidence, and may accept the biased évaluation of witnesses, whereas a 
more objective inquiry might show the claim to be a worthy one. The 
narrower the interest, that is, the fewer the number of employées affected 
by the grievance, the less likely is the union to find the need to process 
the grievance a pressing one. 
One writer, Alfred W. Blumrosen, has pointed out that : 
«The approach of Professor Cox is so narrow as to deprive the 
employée of protection of his critical job claims so long as the union 
acted in good faith. The employée whose claim has been rejected 
may be harmed equally whether the union acted in good faith or bad 
faith. His claim may, however, be clearer against the union action 
motivated by illicit considérations because the wrongdoer cannot claim 
to implement important social policy.63 To protect the individual's 
claim against total subordination to the group, the union's obligation 
must be defined as a duty to process ail meritorious claims of employées 
concerning critical job interests. Whether a claim is meritorious must 
be measured from the vantage point of the individual, not the group. »63a 
60 Op. cit., supra, 386 U.S. at 205. 
61
 Assuming that gross négligence might be covered under a définition of un-
fairness, but there seems to be no authority to this effect. 
62
 For spécifie examples see Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agree-
ments and Arbitration, (1962) 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362, pp. 393-4, and the other 
articles listed in this essay. 
63 Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10 at p . 655. 
63a Ibid, at p. 656. 
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Another writer, Thomas P. Lewis, has suggested that "a rule that 
would require a union to exhaust grievance procédures in a non-frivolous 
discharge case" would be an answer in discharge case, M but feels that : 
« Certainly the difficultés of separating issues of « law » and « fact », 
difficulties probably compounded in the industrial relations field, prevent 
the création of a workable rule under which the union would hâve 
an obligation to take ail nonfrivolous factual disputes to arbitration. » 65 
He arrives at the conclusion that even a broad duty of fair repré-
sentation will not adequately protect the individual. 
« Harassment from litigation would be a problem, and surely the 
greater the duty of fair représentation the greater will be the uncer-
tainty concerning the durability of settlements mutually acceptable to 
the collective parties. But even a broad standard of fair représentation 
will not reach the over-whelming bulk of grievance settlements. For 
one thing, most settlements are honestly and fairly made. And very 
few settlements that are honestly made will be rejected as unfair, 
simply because the kinds of problems that are grist for the grievance 
mill — promotion, seniority, overtime, job assignment, and discharge 
are sufficiently open-ended, factual, and dépendent on the « common 
law » and needs of the shop as developed primarily by the collective 
parties in charge, that unfairness will rarely be obvious enough to 
persuade a judge to action. 
When we add the obstacles to successful challenges of labour man-
agement settlements that naturally attend placing the initiative on the 
employée, it is still more arguable that too little protection, rather 
than too much, will be afforded even by a broad duty of fair repré-
sentation. > 66 
T H E DUTY OF FAIR REPRÉSENTATION IN CANADA 
From an examination of the American approach, it will be seen that 
the way is open for Canadian courts to develop a duty of fair repré-
sentation 67. As mentioned earlier the Canadian judiciary are not unrecep-
tive to the idea. It would not require a great leap in légal reasoning for 
our courts to implement similar standards as hâve been developed in 
the United States. The American courts devised their remedy based on 
the union's statutory duty as bargaining agent, a status very similar to 
that accorded to Canadian unions under Canadian labour relations 
législation. In Canada it would provide an important remedy for indivi-
duals faced with arbitrary, hostile and discriminatory practice of a union. 
Unfortunately, if it is as narrowly defined as it has been in the United 
64 Lewis, op. cit., supra, footnote 37 at p. 123. 
65 ibid. 
66 Ibid. at p. 122. 
67 See Adell, note, 45, Can. Bar. Rev. 354, at p. 359. 
N. de la R. Depuis la rédaction du présent article, voir Fisher v. Pemberton, 
(1970) 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521 (B.C.S.Ct), jugement que commentera le professeur 
Adell dans le prochain numéro de Relations Industrielles. 
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States, and if the individual must prove the union's « bad faith », the 
remedy will not be effective in many areas where an individual has a 
legitimate grievance. 
Insofar as législation is concerned the concept of a duty of fair 
représentation has been mooted by the Task Force on Labour Relations 
in the « Woods Report ».68 The Woods Report points out that : 
« Individualisai can be sacrificed as easily in a bilatéral System of 
industrial government as in a unilatéral o n e . 6 9 
A strong case can be made for assisting unions and their leaders to 
contend with membership pressures without jeopardizing their own posi-
tions, the collective bargaining process, or the welfare of society at 
large. But an equally strong case can be made for ensuring that labour 
organizations do not violate basic démocratie rights of their members 
either as a group or as individuals. Thèse competing interests call for 
a délicate balancing of membership rights and union responsibilities. 70 
Another troublesome issue concerns the relative rights of the collec-
tivity and of individuals in the négociation and administration of a 
collective agreement. The problem can best be illustrated in relation 
to the individual member's right of access to the grievance procédure 
and to arbitration. Normally such access is controlled by the union, 
and this is as it must be if collective bargaining is not to be undermined. 
Yet the union should be expected to exercise this discretionary power 
in a fair and impartial manner if it is not to hâve arbitrary control 
over its members. This suggests that a union should be able to show 
that it acts in good faith whenever it chooses not to pursue a membefs 
grievance or to pursue another one contrary to his interest. 
This must be the limit to any concept of fair représentation if res-
ponsible collective décision making within and between union and 
management is not to be jeopardized. 71 
Whatever is done to protect union membership rights must be accom-
plished without undermining the basic fabric of the labour movement 
or its ability to play a responsible rôle in society. With respect to the 
former, a union is like a country perpetually in conflict with a neighbour 
without which it cannot get along. As a militant organization, a union 
cannot afford the ultimate in democracy. Nor would this be désirable 
from the viewpoint of society at large, since it might preclude a union 
from taking unpopular but responsible positions in the face of mem-
bership restiveness. Accordingly, the challenge is to fashion a code of 
civil rights for union members, and machinery for administering it, 
that neither so weakens unions as to render them ineffective in bar-
gaining nor so exposes them to membership pressures that they cannot 
act responsibly when circumstances dictate. 72 
68
 Op. cit., supra, footnote 18. 
69 ibid, at p. 98. 
70 Ibid, at p. 101. 
71 Ibid, at p. 104. 
72 Ibid, at pp. 104-5. 
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In respect of industrial relations, we recommend that législation guarantee 
a duty of fair représentation, particularly in the handling of riights 
acquired under a collective agreement. We recommend that a mernber 
who is of the view that he has been denied fair représentation hâve 
an appeal to the Public Review Board or, in the absence of such a 
board, to the Canada Labour Relations Board, and that a burden be 
placed on the union to establish that it considered the rights and in-
terests of the individual and that it acted in good faith and in the 
interests of the bargaining unit as a whole. 73 
It should be made clear what it is that unions should be accountable 
for, to whom they should be accountable, and by what procédures 
they should be accountable. 
We recommend that unions should be accountable 
to union members before a public Review Board or the Canada 
Labour Relations Board generally in respect of internai affairs 
of unions and their duty of fair représentation ; 74 
to employers and employées before the Canada Labour Re-
lations Board for matters declared to be union unfair labour 
practices. 75 
The statements of the Woods Report logically apply to the Ontario 
labour scène as well as to the fédéral level. There is little doubt that 
a duty of fair représentation would immeasurably increase the rights of 
an individual employée. It is also clear, that even though it would be 
a major step forward, it will not be a complète answer to the problem. 
Some method that succeeds in measuring the merits of the claim from 
the standpoint of the individual grievance, and that does not also undermine 
the « union's ability to function as a broker between divergent employée 
interests, and its authority to speak on behalf of the group >16 must be 
found. 
THE PUBLIC UTILITY ANALOGY 
It seems that most of the suggestions to limit the power of the 
union and develop remédies for individuals hâve the built-in restriction 
that the employée must not only show that he has been harmed by the 
union concessions or actions, but must also show that the union has 
made no serious attempt to protect his interest. 
The application of responsibility is limited to situations where the 
union has not acted in good faith in one form or another. 
73 ibid, a tp . 152. 
74 ibid, at p. 154. 
75 Ibid, at p. 155. 
76 Arthurs, op. cit., supra, footnote 6 at p. 805. 
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Another suggestion, for example, is the approach of the utility 
analogy.77 The argument hère is that the union should be made to use 
the monopoly power that it is granted by statute in a non-discriminatory 
fashion, and be held accountable through the enforcement of statutory 
standards of fair représentation by the Labour Relations Board. It is 
variant of the fair représentation duty. 
« For example, a union décision to allow management unrestricted 
freedom to innovate may cost workers with low skills and low seniority 
their jobs, although the ultimate resuit of the décision is to ensure 
better wages for the remaining employées in a more profitable 
enterprise. To impugn such a décision, the displaced workers would 
hâve to show not merely that they were harmed by the union's con-
cession, but that the union made no serious attempt to protect them 
by negotiating for alternate employment or severance pay. Similarly, a 
union which provided employées with sub-standard service in the 
prosecution of grievances would only be called to account if it could 
be shown that its failure was due to neglect or discrimination, rather 
than lack of financial resources to employ staff or to pay arbitration 
costs. » 78 
Although this suggestion may hâve the merit of aliowing a broader 
interprétation of the duty of fair représentation than is now seen in the 
United States, it contains the same essential demerit. The standard to 
be employed is based on the behaviour of the union, and not on the 
merits of the individual's complaint. If provisions are to be made to 
protect the individual's interest they should do so. The duty of fair 
représentation tends to protect the union so long as it acts fairly. Unfor-
tunately, in some cases, it also deprives the individual of a remedy. 
THE « COST-BENEFIT » ANALOGY 
The duty of fair représentation originates from the idea of « cost-
benefit analysis ». For every benefit there must be a corresponding cost. 
For the benefit of exclusive authority to represent the employées, the 
union must pay the cost of representing ail individuals fairly. As we 
hâve seen in the United States, the individual is often short-changed. 
Perhaps it would be logical to carry the cost-benefit analogy one step 
further in order to redress the individual for his losses. 
It could be argued that if a union chooses to benefit itself at the 
expense of the individual it should compensate him for his losses. If 
the union sees fit to benefit certain sections of the union at the expense 
of other individuals, then it should see that the individual is compensated 
for his loss. If it chooses not to collect compensation from the group for 
77 ibid, at p. 806, and see Ross, Labor Organizations and the Labor Move-
ment in Advanced Industrial Society, (1964) 50 Va. L. Rev. 1359, at p. 1366 et seq. 
78 ibid. 
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the individual it should be responsable to pay the individual for his reason-
able losses. The union would hâve to pay for every benefit that il; dérives, 
such as a smoother relationship with the company in handling an 
excessive number of grievances. If the union wishes in the interests of 
the greater good, to trade-off individual benefits it must pay for this right, 
even though it acted fairly in the interest of the group. 
The union would not be hindered in its freedom of action vis-à-vis 
the employer. It would compensate the employée wherever the claim 
itself was legitimate and the union for one reason or another decided to 
abrogate the claim. 
Obviously, the ramifications of such a proposai would hâve to be 
pursued in greater depth. It may create more problems than it solves. 
However, the cost-benefit analogy is increasingly becoming the basis on 
which reforms in many fields are being introduced throughout the free 
enterprise world. In Germany if a company pollutes the air, it pays a fee 
for so doing. In Ontario car drivers must carry some form of insurance 
as a cost of the benefit of being able to use the roads. Eventually, unions 
may décide to create spécial funds from which compensation will be paid 
to individual employées whose legitimate grievances hâve been compro-
mised in the interests of the union as a whole or other groups in the 
union. 
CRITICAL JOB INTERESTS AND SECONDARY ONES 
In devising a remedy for the individual it will be important to dis-
tinguish between critical job interests and secondary ones. 79 In the former, 
we are dealing with important problems involving discharge, compensa-
tion, seniority and the like, whereas secondary problems are concerned 
with less critical matters. 
It is vital that an individual find a forum that gives him redress for 
violations of his critical job interests, as they go to the very heart of his 
self-respect as a person. If a question of discharge arises and the union 
feels that it has acted fairly, the individual who is a non-union employée 
is no longer in the plant and is easily forgotten. It is important that some 
minimum protection is designed for critical job interests. 
Inevitably, there are many secondary matters that the union will re-
fuse to process because the cost would be far beyond the benefit derived 
for the individual. One answer would be to provide that the individual 
should bear the costs if he is able to force an adjudication on the merits of 
his claim and looses. He should also bear costs if he wins and the claim 
was frivolous.80 
79 Blumrosen, op. cit., supra, footnote 10, pp. 651-3. 
80
 See Lewis, op. cit., supra, footnote 37, at p. 103; Summers, op. cit., supra, 
footnote 62, at p. 403. 
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 343 
CONCLUSION 
A union acquires légal rights as a group, and the group is the principal 
beneficiary. 
Every individual union member recognizes that he is no stronger 
than the union as a whole and that his income and security are, in the 
main, based on its existence. It is in his interests to protect the union's 
power as a collective whole. An individual cannot be allowed to paralyze 
necessary collective action or interfère with legitimate group needs. This 
does not mean that his interest must be sacrificed at the altar of the 
collective and his rights must be protected wherever possible. 
Our system of democracy opérâtes under the supposition that indi-
vidual rights are primary. Increasing attention is paid to conceptions that 
provide group benefits, but underlying ail group justifications is the ration-
ale that minority rights must be protected. Individual benefit is the dé-
mocratie basis of collective action. The collective action of the union is 
justified by the benefits that it provides to the individual employée. In 
creating rights for the individual against the group, if the merits of the 
claim are judged by the interests of the group, the foundation for the 
right is turned upside down. We should try to find some way to protect 
the individual within the group and at the same time protect the group so 
that it can function effectively in the interests of the individuals within its 
purview. 
Lewis has suggested that: 
« A firm ruling that an individual grievant has contract rights within 
the limits of meaning that can be reasonably be assigned to given 
contract language, rights that can be taken away only through an 
acknowledged amendment of the contract, would make a substantial 
addition and departure from the theory that a union can control 
contract rights subject only to the duty of fair représentation. The 
overall resuit would be a degree, a blend of the Cox and Summers 
analysis. » 81 
Blumrosen points out that: 
« The conflict between individual autonomy and joint union-employer 
authority cannot be resolved solely by use of the concept that the 
union owes a fiduciary duty to the employée. Nor can it be resolved 
solely by a firm détermination to protect individual employée rights 
against union encroachment. Both of thèse approaches ignore the fact 
that where the union sides with the employer and against the employée, 
it asserts, with the employer, a claim to freedom of action in running 
the industrial establishment. The employee's claim is not solely against 
81
 Op. cit., supra, footnote 37 at p. 111. 
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the union. It is against employer-union joint action. This is true even 
where the joint décision takes the form of union acquiescence in an 
employer décision. » 82 
The argument in f avour of limiting the union's responsibility so long 
as it acts fairly is primarily based on the supposition that the union must 
be free to act as it sees fit in the best interests of the union. If its freedom 
of action is hindered, if it is forced to spend excessive amounts of time 
and money in dealing with minor complaints, if it is to live in fear of 
suits by disgruntled individuals who feel that they hâve been unjustly 
handled, then it cannot discharge its obligations to the majority of its mem-
bers effectively. Thèse are valid arguments. The individual benefits from 
a union that is able to speak effectively on his behalf. But this does not 
mean that he must sacrifice his personal interests for the benefit of the 
union. Individual subordination and individual deprivation are not neces-
sarily synonymous. Some way must be found to protect the individual who 
has been deprived of a benefit. 
We hâve canvassed a number of alternatives that may be available 
to him. It looks as if the duty of fair représentation is the one most likely 
to be adopted in Canada if the Woods Report is any indication of the trend 
of current thinking.83 Unfortunately, this approach does not seem to reco-
gnize that the key question is not whether the union acted unfairly but 
whether the employée had a legitimate grievance. 
In providing answers to the problems, it often seems that we must 
choose between completely opposing alternatives. Although this is an 
inévitable concommitment of situations that involve conflicting parties with 
diverse interests in a given dispute, we must attempt to work out an accom-
modation based on the needs of ail the parties. The individual must be 
included with the employer and the union, as one of thèse parties. 
LES DROITS DU SYNDIQUÉ DOIVENT-ILS ÊTRE SACRIFIÉS 
POUR PROTÉGER LES INTÉRÊTS DU GROUPE ? 
Si un travailleur salarié ne peut présenter lui-même un grief portant sur l'ap-
plication ou l'interprétation de la convention collective, ni forcer le syndicat qui le 
représente à porter son cas à l'arbitrage, possède-t-il un recours contre le syndicat 
si ce dernier n'a pas accompli son devoir de représenter ses intérêts? 
Nous voulons dans cet article revoir d'une façon générale quelques-unes des 
solutions proposées pour résoudre ce problème, en insistant sur le « devoir de juste 
représentation », tel qu'il est envisagé aux États-Unis et au Canada. Nous mettrons 
ici en relief quelques-unes des limites, et les aspects positifs des solutions envisagées. 
82
 Op. cit., supra, footnote 10, at p. 635. 
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 Op. cit., supra, footnote 71; and see the Toronto Globe, March 27, p. B6. 
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Dans certains cas limités, un salarié est effectivement protégé contre les dis-
criminations graves de la part de son syndicat. Toutefois, un syndicat peut com-
promettre la situation spécifique d'un salarié durant la négociation, aussi bien que 
dans l'application d'une convention collective. Bien qu'un salarié peut avoir des 
droits reconnus et protégés par la cour, il demeure toutefois que ses droits relèvent 
essentiellement de la convention collective et du pouvoir de négociation du syndicat. 
Il y a parfois conflit entre les intérêts du syndicat et ceux du salarié. Pendant 
la négociation de la convention, une hausse de salaire ou un autre avantage pour 
ce salarié en échange de la conclusion d'un accord qui bénéficiera à l'ensemble 
du syndicat ou à la majorité de ses membres. Quoiqu'il faille protéger la liberté 
d'action du syndicat, on ne peut pas lui permettre, d'autre part, d'éliminer tout 
bonnement les droits d'un individu en vue de l'obtention de certains bénéfices 
pour l'ensemble des membres du syndicat. On ne peut tolérer non plus que le syn-
dicat compromette les droits individuels qui relèvent de la convention collective, 
en refusant de soumettre des griefs légitimes à l'arbitrage. 
Il se rencontre souvent dans une unité de négociation divers groupes dont les 
intérêts entreront, à un moment donné, en conflit avec les réclamations des indivi-
dus. En vue de résoudre ces conflits, le syndicat peut décider de satisfaire le groupe 
de travailleurs majoritaires et sacrifier ainsi la demande de l'individu en faveur 
du «bien commun ». 
CONDUITE JUSTE ET CONDUITE INJUSTE DE LA PART DU SYNDICAT 
Il existe deux secteurs généraux où le syndicat peut aller à rencontre des 
intérêts de ses membres pris individuellement: 1) lorsque le syndicat a agi d'une 
façon injuste envers un individu et; 2) lorsque l'action du syndicat peut être définie 
objectivement comme étant juste envers les travailleurs, mais, de fait, empêche un 
individu d'obtenir satisfaction dans le règlement d'un légitime grief. Entrent dans la 
catégorie de conduites injustes les attitudes hostiles, arbitraires ou discriminatoires 
que le syndicat manifeste envers l'un ou l'autre de ses membres. D'autre part, le 
syndicat peut, par négligence, en arriver aux mêmes résultats; enfin il y a des cas 
où le syndicat peut agir d'une façon juste et correcte si on se place du point de 
vue du syndicat même objectivement, mais pas nécessairement du point de vue de 
l'individu. 
Les remèdes auxquels Pindivdu peut recourir proviennent de trois sources bien 
connues: la jurisprudence, la loi, les statuts des syndicats. 
LES RECOURS JURIDIQUES 
Les tribunaux s'attribuent le rôle de protecteurs de l'intérêt public; ils ont 
condamné les syndicats lorsque ceux-ci ont agi, selon le jugement de la cour, d'une 
façon nuisible au bien-être général de la société. Ils pourraient bien décider que 
les excès du syndicat et leurs abus vis-à-vis les salariés individuels soient proscrits 
par le judiciaire. 
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Malheureusement, beaucoup d'effets secondaires possibles peuvent se glisser 
dam des redressements créés judiciairement dans le secteur des relations du travail. 
Les tribunaux ont tendance à se montrer insuffisamment renseignés sur la structure 
et les problèmes sous-jacents à ce secteur, et à leur appliquer des considérations 
légales qui exacerbent indûment. Quoique ces effets ne soient pas inévitables, il 
reste que la réaction généralement défavorable des syndicats face aux tribunaux 
semble indiquer que l'on pourrait en arriver mieux à la paix industrielle si l'on 
cherchait ailleurs une solution aux problèmes des individus. 
REMÈDES D'ORDRE LÉGISLATIF 
Il n'existe pas de lois fédérales ou provinciales qui imposent spécifiquement 
aux syndicats un devoir de juste représentation, mais divers articles fournissent une 
assistance à l'individu dans les cas où le syndicat a exercé une discrimination à l'en-
droit d'un individu à cause de sa race, son origine, sa couleur, sa religion, son 
sexe ou son âge. Une loi sur les justes méthodes d'emploi existe déjà au fédéral et 
dans huit provinces canadiennes. 
Une Commission des relations du travail ou un tribunal du travail pourraient 
fournir un substitut aux tribunaux civils pour le jugement des conflits individuels. 
Les Commission des relations du travail ont tenté, dans le passé, de trouver des 
solutions au problème. Si les CRT pouvaient s'occuper administrativement du cas 
des individus, on leur économiserait beaucoup de frais et de temps. Ce système a des 
mérites induscutables. On pourrait encore créer des tribunaux du travail. Dans les 
deux cas, il se développerait une jurisprudence en ce domaine. 
CORRECTIONS D'ORIGINE SYNDICALE 
Un exemple de mécanismes de redressement fournis par le syndicat est la 
Commission de révision publique des TUA (UAW Public Review Board) qui semble 
protéger davantage l'individu. Cependant, la philosophie syndicale fondamentale 
amenuise les besoins individuels, insiste davantage sur les formes d'action collective 
et se montre ainsi peu favorable à ces nouveaux mécanismes. Il faut noter aussi 
que tout en protégeant les individus d'une hostilité flagrante de la part du syndicat, 
les exigences d'une Commission de révision publique ne fourniraient pas d'assis-
tance protectrice à l'individu même dans le cas où sa requête est légitime, si ses 
intérêts sont contraires aux besoins de la majorité, ou s'il est incapable de prouver 
l'existence de malice syndicale dans le traitement de son cas. L'implantation de con-
trôles internes indiquerait une maturité croissante et un nouveau sens des responsa-
bilités chez les syndicats. 
LE DEVOIR DE JUSTE REPRÉSENTATION 
Le devoir de juste représentation a été créé en vue de protéger l'individu con-
tre un groupe. Si l'intérêt du groupe devient le critère de la validité d'une requête, 
ce droit perd tout son sens en ce qui concerne l'individu. Aux États-Unis, ce sont 
les tribunaux qui ont développé ce droit. Le devoir de juste représentation fut re-
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connu lors du cas Steele c. Louisville & N.R. Co. Dans le cas de Miranda Fuel, le 
Conseil national des relations ouvrières (The National Labour Relations Board) 
jugea que l'omission par le syndicat de représenter d'une façon juste le salarié consti-
tuait une pratique syndicale déloyale. 
Il reste que le devoir de juste représentation a été défini d'une façon assez 
restreinte, laissant l'individu à la merci du syndicat. Même si le syndicat n'agit pas 
d'une façon ouvertement hostile ou fortement négligente envers l'individu lors du 
règlement d'un grief, il peut de fait éliminer les réclamations justifiées de l'individu. 
Les syndicats peuvent aussi échanger des griefs légitimes pour un bloc d'avantages 
lorsque cette action favorise les intérêts de la majorité des membres du syndicat. 
Nous devons donc conclure cette partie en soulignant qu'à notre avis, même une 
définition plus large de représentation juste ne protégerait pas l'individu de façon 
adéquate. 
LE DEVOIR DE REPRÉSENTATION JUSTE AU CANADA 
Les tribunaux canadiens devraient développer une attitude face au devoir de juste 
représentation qui soit semblable à ce qui se passe aux États-Unis. C'est là une 
tâche que le système judiciaire canadien ne trouverait pas très difficile à assumer. 
Le remède prévu par les tribunaux américains se base sur l'obligation légale que le 
syndicat possède d'agir en tant qu'agent de négociation, obligation très semblable 
à celle que la législation canadienne en relations du travail lui accorde. Devant une 
attitude hostile ou discriminatoire du syndicat, le salarié canadien serait bien pro-
tégé. L'individu risque malheureusement de trouver personne pour défendre le grief 
qu'il soulève si la définition du « devoir de juste représentation » s'avère aussi 
étroite qu'aux États-Unis, et si l'individu doit prouver lui-même la « mauvaise foi » 
du syndicat. 
Le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée a discuté du concept de « devoir de juste 
représentation », et a recommandé que les syndicats répondent « envers leurs mem-
bres, de leur régie interne et de leur devoir de représentation, devant une Commis-
sion publique de révision ou devant le Conseil canadien des relations ouvrières »; 
et « devant les employeurs et les employés, des pratiques déloyales, devant le Con-
seil canadien des relations ouvrières ». 
Il y a nul doute qu'une obligation de juste représentation augmenterait forte-
ment les droits individuels de l'employé. Il est évident aussi qu'une telle démarche, 
si importante soit-elle, n'apportera pas un règlement complet du problème. Il faut 
trouver une méthode qui puisse mesurer le bien fondé d'une réclamation du point de 
vue de l'individu, et qui ne mine pas en même temps la capacité et l'autorité du 
syndicat, lequel doit agir comme arbitre face aux intérêts divergents des employés 
en même temps que le porte-parole de l'unité de négociation. 
L'ANALOGIE DE L'UTILITÉ PUBLIQUE 
Un autre aspect à étudier consiste à trouver le moyen d'amener le syndicat à 
utiliser son monopole légal de représentation d'une façon non-discriminatoire à le 
348 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 25, NO 2 
faire répondre devant le Conseil des relations ouvrières de ses manquements à des 
normes statutaires de juste représentation. Cette suggestion semble avoir le mérite 
de donner à la notion de « devoir de juste représentation » une définition plus large 
que celle qui est actuellement acceptée aux États-Unis. La norme à utiliser se base 
non pas sur la plainte de l'individu, mais sur le comportement du syndicat. 
L'ANALOGIE COÛTS-BÉNÉFICES 
Le « devoir de juste représentation » tient son origine de l'analogie « coûts-
bénéfices ». En échange d'un bénéfice, soit le monopole de représentation, le syn-
dicat doit assumer le coût qu'implique la représentation équitable de chaque salarié. 
Mais de fait, l'individu arrive souvent « en dessous ». Il serait peut être logique de 
pousser l'analogie plus loin en vue de compenser pour les pertes de l'individu. On 
se sert actuellement de l'analogie « coûts-bénéfices » comme base pour une foule 
de réformes différentes. Eventuellement, les syndicats devraient prendre la décision 
de créer un fond spécial pour dédommager les individus dont les griefs légitimes ont 
été compromis en vue de favoriser les intérêts de l'ensemble des membres. 
LES PRÉOCCUPATIONS PREMIÈRES ET SECONDAIRES DE L'EMPLOYÉ 
Il faut envisager, pour remédier au problème de l'individu, une distinction entre 
les aspects importants d'un emploi et ceux qui lui sont secondaires. Aux premiers 
se greffent des problèmes tels que le congédiement, les formes de compensation, 
l'ancienneté, etc. tandis qu'aux deuxièmes se rattachent des points de litige secon-
daires. Il est vital pour l'individu qu'il ait, comme employé, une protection mini-
mum contre toute violation de ses intérêts premiers et qu'une forme de redresse-
ment lui soit fournie contre toute violation de ces intérêts. 
CONCLUSION 
Un syndicat acquiert des droits légaux en tant que groupe, et le groupe en est 
le premier bénéficiaire: il est donc dans l'intérêt de l'indivdu qu'il protège la force 
de son représentant. Mais cela ne signifie pas d'autre part que les droits et les inté-
rêts de l'individu doivent être sacrifiés à la collectivité. 
La démocratie occidentale a toujours favorisé les droits individuels. On mani-
feste de plus en plus d'intérêt aux conceptions qui créent des bénéfices collectifs, 
mais toujours dans l'optique que les droits de la minorité doivent être protégés. 
Nous devons trouver des moyens qui protègent l'individu à l'intérieur du groupe, 
tout en protégeant le groupe pour qu'il puisse atteindre efficacement les fins du 
groupe. L'individu retire des avantages d'être membre d'un syndicat qui lui sert 
de porte-parole efficace, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il doive sacrifier ses in-
térêts personnels au profit du syndicat. Une nouvelle forme d'accommodation doit 
être découverte, et l'individu doit être partie du système, comme le sont actuellement 
l'employeur et le syndicat. 
